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Catholic Social Thought (CST) is coherent body of principles concerning the or-
ganization of social and economic life drawing on the inspiration of natural law,
Thomism, the Gospel and the tradition of Christian personalism. While valu-
ing the creative energy of capitalism and its contributions to the production of
wealth, it is often highly critical of the inequalities generated by capitalism, its
tendency to promote materialistic consumerism and capital’s devaluation of the
dignity of work. While not easily characterizable as “right” or ”left”, CST think-
ing about corporate social responsibility and corporate governance has become
split between interpretations emphasizing the importance of economic liberty to
human dignity (a central CST value) and those deriving from a much more com-
munitarian conception of that dignity. This paper contests the neoconsevative
positions articulated principally by Michael Novak, and identiﬁes the core CST
premises that lead to a much more communitarian vision of the corporation. In
so doing, it emphasizes afﬁnities between that vision and secular views of the
corporation derived from the critical and legal progressive traditions.Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought
Mark A. Sargent
*
I. Introduction: Can Catholic Social Thought Help Us Understand Corporations and 
the Law of Corporations?
The threshold question for legal scholars contemplating Catholic Social Thought (CST) is 
whether CST can help us in our two principal tasks as legal scholars: describing the operation of 
the legal system and prescribing how the legal system should operate.  Those of us interested in the 
law of corporations and other business associations,
1 and the closely-related field of securities 
regulation should ask whether CST can add anything to our understanding of how the relevant law 
operates and to the recommendations we make about that operation.  In particular, we should ask
whether CST provides a basis for critique of the norms operative in corporate law theory.
On a superficial level, the answer to that question is easy.  CST can provide a normative 
framework on the basis of which we can perform our descriptive and prescriptive tasks.  In that 
sense,  CST  is  not  functionally  different  from  the  other  normative  frameworks,  either 
acknowledged  or  unacknowledged,  that  inform  our  work  on  legal  issues,  whether  those 
frameworks are utilitarian, pragmatic, critical, “progressive” or something else.  When we get 
down to the hard work of articulating and applying CST as a normative framework, however, the 
question  becomes  more  difficult.    There  are  conceptual  and  practical  problems  that  make  it 
difficult to explain precisely how CST can operate as such a framework for understanding the law 
of corporations.
For Catholic legal scholars this question of “how” is an urgent one, because for us CST is 
not just another possible normative framework that we can choose or not choose to take seriously 
based on intellectual persuasiveness, our curiosity, or fashion.  CST is wound intricately into our 
beliefs and deeply rooted in the Gospel and Catholic natural law traditions.  It is thus potentially 
a challenge to our assumptions about how law should operate.  This does not mean that we need to 
treat every iteration of the social tradition as incontrovertible truth.  To the contrary, CST is by 
definition a sphere of prudential judgment in which we try to discern the meaning of our faith for 
complex questions of social and economic life.  It thus allows for disagreement, change and 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Many thanks to Steve Bainbridge and Barbara 
Wall, who provided very different but equally helpful comments on drafts.  I look forward to engaging with Steve in 
the future on both our areas of agreement and disagreement about Catholic Social Thought.  Thanks also to the 
participants in a workshop on Religious Values and Corporate decisionmaking sponsored by Fordham University 
School of Law, where I presented a version of this paper.
1 For simplicity's sake, I will use the terms “corporation,” “law of corporations” or “corporate law” to refer to all 
types of business association and the pertinent law.development in understanding.
2  But CST does embody a coherent world view centered on the 
core principles of human dignity, the common good, the reciprocity of rights and obligations, the 
contingency of property rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor.
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These are not merely a series of well-meaning platitudes.  They have substantive content that 
should influence how choices are made in the real social and economic worlds.  Taking those 
principles seriously means that Catholic corporate law scholars are faced with the challenge of 
understanding how CST can be translated into a normative framework for a critical understanding 
of current corporate law theory.   Non-Catholic corporate law scholars also may find that CST 
principles will resonate with purely secular critiques of the dominant corporate law theoretical 
paradigm.
A.  The Problem of Translation
How does one translate the broad moral norms established in papal documents and bishops' 
statements into guiding legal principles for the resolution of specific legal problems in the law of 
corporations?  While those documents and statements obviously concern themselves with the 
goals of economic life, the organization of economic institutions, the relationship between labor 
and capital, and the moral constraints upon capitalism, they operate at a level of considerable 
generality.  They also usually avoid making specific policy recommendations, recognizing the 
hierarchy's limited expertise, leaving questions of application to the prudential judgment and 
moral discernment of the laity.  While CST can provide a set of relevant moral norms, much 
groundwork needs to be done before we can construct a CST theory of the corporation and a 
CST-inspired method of resolving problems in the law of corporations.  Doing that groundwork 
will require, however, recognition of some major disagreements within the CST tradition itself 
which  are  particularly  relevant  to  understanding  how  the  question  of  the  corporation  and 
corporation law should be approached.
B. Whose CST?
One of the consequences of the general and open-ended quality of the key CST documents, 
and the consequent deferral to the laity's judgment in interpreting and applying CST principles to 
concrete problems, is a wide diversity of opinion about what CST means or requires.  CST, of 
course, cannot be situated on a traditional left/right axis.  It is a distinctive body of thought with its 
own goals, premises and core values.  Some of its aspects tend to resonate with the left, such as its 
communitarian ethos and concern with the excesses of capitalism, and other aspects appeal to the 
right, such as its insistence on the dignity of life (including unborn life) and the way the principle 
of subsidiarity supports a limited conception of state power.  CST arrives at those positions, 
however, for reasons that may have little to do with the philosophical premises of the secular 
political left or right.  CST criticizes capitalism, for example, because its modern manifestations 
2 For citations to sources discussing this characteristic of Catholic social thought [hereinafter referred to as CST], 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholders Debate, 4 VILL. J. L. & INVEST. MGMT. 3, 
4 n. 10 (2002) at www.law.villanova.edu/shared/joflawandinvmgmt/docs/fall2002volume4number1.pdf [hereinafter 
Bishops].
3 For a concise summary of these core principles in their relevance to law, see Lucia Silecchia, Reflections on the 
Future of Social Justice, 23 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1121 (2000).contribute to a soul-less, materialistic, isolating consumer culture violative of true human dignity, 
not because CST inherently favors state ownership of the means of production.  CST's concept of 
subsidiarity, however, recognizes a vigorous role for government in promoting social justice.  
While  not  socialistic  in  its  premises,  subsidiarity  insists  that  higher  authorities  (such  as 
governments) have a responsibility to pursue justice when subordinate (i.e., private) authorities are 
unwilling or unable to do so.  Even more important, CST resists characterization as “left” or 
“right,”  because  it  is  a  coherent,  organic  whole,  with  its  unique  elements  intended  to  be 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing.
CST has, however, developed something that can be called left and right wings, for want 
of better labels.  These wings result from varying emphasis on different parts of CST, and reflect 
the ideological predispositions brought to the understanding of CST.  Sometimes the process of 
interpretation is little more than superficial, highly selective cherry-picking of CST concepts (or 
rhetoric), to buttress positions the interpreter already holds.  Sometimes the tilt to the right or the 
left results  from principled convictions  about what CST (or, more  generally, Catholicism or 
Christianity) “really” means.  This can turn into a bitter controversy over which version of CST is 
more  “authentically”  Catholic,  a  controversy  reflecting  fundamental  disagreements  among 
Catholics today about what it means to be Catholic that amount to a culture war.  Compare, for 
example, Michael Perry,
4 who noted that “authentically Christian premises do not yield Burkean 
social conservatism” and Paul Tillich, who stated that socialism “is the only possible economic 
system from the Christian point of view,”
5 with Michael Novak
6 and the writers associated with 
the Acton Institute,
7 who derive a profoundly anti-statist emphasis on the free market from CST 
and Christian principles generally.
CST's vulnerability (if that is the proper word) to highly disparate, ideologically conflicting 
interpretations and applications is particularly evident in the thinking about CST's meaning for the 
corporation and the law of corporations.  Indeed, two competing visions have developed, which 
collectively show both the potential fruitfulness and the unsettled nature of CST as a normative 
framework for thinking about law.  One of those visions, perhaps the one usually associated with 
CST, is essentially communitarian.  The other rejects many of the premises of the communitarian 
vision,  and  regards  them  as  secular,  leftist  intrusions  into  genuinely  Catholic  thought.    It 
emphasizes, instead, the importance of liberty, especially economic liberty, to the flourishing of 
the human person.  My purpose in this paper is to outline those competing visions, and to ask what 
the emergence of such contrasting views from CST has to tell us about the meaning of CST for the 
law.  My conclusion will be that the vision of the corporation articulated by Michael Novak and 
other  Catholic  neo-conservatives,  and  put  forward  as  a  genuine,  indeed  the  most  genuine 
expression of CST, is actually based on a highly selective, ideologically driven and ultimately 
misleading  reading  of  CST.    As  such,  Novak’s  understanding  of  the  corporation  (and  its 
relationship to the state) does not provide a reliable basis for discerning CST’s meaning for 
4 MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 77 (2003).
5 Quoted in MICHAEL NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, FREEDOM WITH JUSTICE 12 
(2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS].
6 For discussion of NOVAK, see infra, notes 28-55 and accompanying text.
7 For information about the Acton Institute and links to the works of authors associated with it, see the Institute's 
website at http://www.acton.org.corporate law.  Of greater potential interest is the work of Stephen Bainbridge, who aligns himself 
with  Novak,  but  who  uses  the  analytical  tools  of  law  and  economics  to  critique  in  a  more 
sophisticated and concrete way both the communitarian norms and specific applications of CST.  
Whether Bainbridge has positioned himself as a critical voice within the social tradition, or against
the tradition, remains to be determined.  Resolving that question will be important to determining 
CST’s potential relevance for corporate law. 
II. The Communitarian Vision
A. The Corporation as a Community and In the Community
The mainstream CST vision of the corporation is communitarian.  This vision derives from 
a cluster of CST concepts.  The key concept is anthropological: an understanding of the human 
person as essentially social.  As a social being, the person is not merely an autonomous bearer of 
rights, but part of a community that should be ordered toward the common good, and in which 
rights and duties are reciprocal.  In this view, property and profits are not evil, but are not ends in 
themselves; they are instrumental to genuine human flourishing and for the production of the 
common good.  These concepts are central to a notion of the corporation as a community, in which 
the profit motive, while entirely legitimate, is essentially just an “indicator that a business is 
functioning well.”
8  In this vision, the corporation is an institution: (i) that must be dedicated to the 
flourishing of its employees as human beings; (ii) in which the shareholders' rights of ownership 
are constrained by duties to others within the corporate community; (iii) whose managers must 
concern themselves with the common good; and (iv) which, as a matter of Christian anthropology, 
must  produce  not  just  wealth,  but  the  conditions  under  which  human  persons  may  flourish 
spiritually.
9  This approach recognizes that the corporation will still be faced with tragic choices 
that may result in adverse consequences for some stakeholders, but it insists that communal values, 
and the conditioned, reciprocal nature of rights be taken seriously as those choices are made.  An 
image of the corporation as a human community has been developed eloquently in Professor Scott 
FitzGibbon's
10 work, as well as in the work of economists and business ethicists drawing on the 
Catholic Social tradition.
11
8 POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS¶35, available at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/ca.htm.  See also U.S. 
CATHOLIC CONF., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2432 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter CATECHISM] (“Those 
responsible  for  business  enterprises  are  responsible  to  society  for  the  economic  and  ecological  effects  of  their 
operations.  They have an obligation to consider the good of persons and not only increase of profits.”).
9 J. Michael Stebbins, Business, Faith and the Common Good, ST. JOHN'S UNIV. REV. BUS., Fall 1997, at 5 (“The 
purpose of the economic order is to provide a standard of living that not only meets people’s basic physical needs . . . 
but also facilitates their pursuit of higher values, including the highest value of all, the ultimate goal of union with 
God.”). This notion is deeply rooted in the CST conception of work.  In reflecting on Pope John Paul II's elaboration 
of this concept, which emphasizes that work must be understood in the subjective sense, Jean Bethke Elshtain has 
written that: “Human beings are intentional beings who realize their humanity in and through work.  It follows that the 
primary value of work cannot be measured in simple economic terms but in the fact that one is doing it as a person.” 
(emphasis in the original). Jean Bethke Elshtain, Catholic Social Teaching and the Meaning of Work, in PONTIFICAL 
COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, WORK AS KEY TO THE SOCIAL QUESTION: THE GREAT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATIONS AND THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF WORK 31,33 (2002) [hereinafter WORK AS KEY].
10 See Scott Fitzgibbon, “True Human Community”: Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelian Ethics, and the Moral 
Order of the Business Company, 45 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1243 (2001).
11 See, for example, the authors who contributed to RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, INTERDISCIPLINARY The communitarian vision is also manifest in CST conceptions of the corporation in the 
community.  This conception of the corporation in the community is complex.  At its most general 
level, it draws on Pope John Paul II's critique of capitalism.
12  To the extent that the corporation's 
determined pursuit of profit transforms greed into a virtue, and treats acquisition of wealth as an 
end in itself, it contributes to the spiritual emptiness of a materialistic culture and undermines the 
common good.  One of the principal themes of the Pope has been the ongoing tension between 
modern  capitalism  and  Christian  anthropology  that  results  from  capitalism's  tendency  to 
instrumentalize human persons rather than treat them as an end in themselves.
13  The Pope's deeply 
personalist view of the meaning of work, which insists on the priority of the subjective experience 
of work, leads him to insist upon a subordination of the pursuit of profit to the creation of a 
participatory community.
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ESSAYS FROM THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION (S.A. Cortright & Michael J. Naughton, eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS]. 
12 For an excellent summary of that nuanced critique, see CHARLES E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 
1891-PRESENT, A HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS 204-09 (2002) [hereinafter CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING]. For discussion emphasizing the critical nature of Pope John Paul II's thinking about capitalism in relation 
to  his  critique  of  communism,  see  Wieslaw  Piatkowski,  Ethical  Foundations  of  the  Economy  in  Light  of  the 
Encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, ST. JOHN'S UNIV. REV. BUS., Fall 2001, at 29, available at www.stjohns.edu/pls/ 
portal30/sjudev.retrieve_edu_img_data?img_id=1109.
13 See Charles M. Clark, Catholic Social Thought and Economic Transitions, ST. JOHN'S UNIV. REV. BUS., Fall 
2001,  at  25  available at  www.stjohns.edu/pls/portal30/sjudev.retrieve_edu_img_data?img_id=1109  (“The  key 
distinction that CST makes is that humans can never be treated as means to an end, for they are the ends.”).  For 
elaboration  on  the  connection  between  such  instrumentalization  and  what  John  Paul  II  calls  “alienation,”  see 
Jean-Yves Calvez and Michael J. Naughton, Catholic Social Teaching and the Purpose of the Business Organization, 
in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 3.
John Paul II describes this alienation in business as ensuring “maximum returns and profits with no 
concern  whether  the  worker,  through  his  own  labor,  grows  or  diminishes  as  a  person.”  This 
alienation  in  part  stems  from  persons'  refusal  to  transcend  themselves  by  instrumentalizing 
everything,  including  their  own  relationships,  within  the  firm.  For  example,  managers  treat 
employees well not because they are created in the image of God, but because it will maximize 
shareholder wealth.  This pervasive logic of instrumentalization within corporations today obstructs 
the habits of mind and heart by which persons authentically give themselves to God and others.
Id. at 12.
14 See Curran's discussion of the encyclicals Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus, CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT, supra note 12, at 195, 204-09, with respect to this point. The subordination of profit in John Paul II's 
thinking is not a function of naive anti-capitalism or leftist bias, but an expression of his Christian personalist 
understanding of the meaning of work.
Property rights are real but are not absolute and must be subordinated to a common good.  John Paul 
calls  for  creative  labor-management  alliances,  worker-sharing  in  management  and  profits, 
democratization of the workplace B this not so much in the interest of enhancing the bottom line of 
profit but of offering to the person working a broader, richer set of possible meanings of his or her 
work.
Elshtain, supra note 9, at 34.  For criticism of the CST valorization of labor participation in workplace governance, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory Management 
and Natural Law, 43 VILL L. REV. 741 (1998) [hereinafter Corporate Decisionmaking].  Bainbridge argues, inter alia, 
that the emphasis on the importance of participatory rights is misplaced for several theoretical and practical reasons, 
including employees’ lack of interest in exercising such rights.  From a CST perspective, however, the important thing 
is the availability of such rights; that employees have varying degrees of interest in exercising them is predictable.  
Predictable, but lamentable.  Indifference to such rights may be a sign of defects in community.At a more specific level, the corporation's social responsibilities within the community are 
a major theme of the communitarian vision.  Those responsibilities extend from concern for 
environmental  stewardship  to  prevention  of  global  labor  inequality  to  non-cooperation  with 
oppressive or racist government regimes, and include much more.
15  The vision also may include 
a critique of globalization, and a tendency to identify large multinational corporations as prime 
actors in an economic movement seen as an affront to solidarity.
16
In  short,  the  communitarian  vision  of  the  corporation  as  a  community  and  in  the 
community includes a critical set of assumptions about how corporations should operate.  This 
critical posture is evident in the specific communitarian recommendations for corporate law.
B. Implications for Corporate Law
The CST communitarian vision of the constitution has two major, related implications for 
the law of corporations.  First, its sense of the corporation as an actor in the community encourages 
a robust view of corporate social responsibility.  In this view, the corporation's responsibilities as 
a social actor extend beyond mere compliance with the external framework of laws relating to 
labor,  the  environment,  safety  and  health  regulation  and  the  like.    This  view  rejects  the 
presumption that corporations should be required only to obey the laws constituting the vast (and 
costly) web of regulatory constraints surrounding corporations.  Instead, the law of corporate 
governance  should  create  structures,  incentives  and  penalties  designed  to  ensure  corporate 
awareness  of  and  accountability  for  its  social  responsibilities:  a  legally-constituted  social 
conscience.  Legal rules designed to foster a greater sense of corporate social responsibility, even 
at the expense of profit to the shareholders, are, from this perspective, essential if corporations are 
to contribute to the common good, rather than use their vast power to undermine it.
Perhaps the best example of this concept of corporate governance is the activity of the 
Catholic religious orders, who use their status as shareholders under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's proxy rules
17 governing shareholder proposals to place a variety of social justice 
concerns  (themselves  derived  from  CST  principles)  on  corporate  management's  proxy 
statements.
18  Such  social  justice  resolutions  rarely  generate  enough  shareholder  votes  to  be 
approved, but they have the effect of publicizing the company's involvement in questionable social 
practices, focusing shareholders' attention on the issue, and placing the issue more firmly on 
15 These types of CST concern are expressed in the activism of the Catholic religious orders who attempt to place 
such social justice concerns on the agendas of public corporations.  See infra, notes 17-18.
16 The negative effects of globalization have been one of the major preoccupations of the Jesuits' Center of Concern, 
which in the ‘90s became highly critical of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, particularly with 
respect to global labor inequality.  See the Center's website at http://www.coc.org.
17 For citations to those rules and relevant SEC no-action letter and discussion of the shareholder proposal process, 
see Mark A. Sargent and Dennis R. Honabach, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK §§ 5.1-5.46 (ed. 2003).
18 The Catholic religious orders often coordinate their use of the SEC shareholder proposal mechanism through the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.  See the Center's website at http://www.iccr.org.  Among the issues 
identified by the website as among its priorities are Access to Health Care; the Contract Supplier System (i.e., 
sweatshops, wage inequality and the lack of a sustainable living wage, unfair labor practices); Environmental Justice; 
Global Warming; and Violence and the Militarization of Society.  Among the many Catholic orders listed as members 
are the Adrian Dominican Sisters, Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes, Franciscan Holy Name Province of New 
York, Jesuit Conference, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, Missionary Oblates of Mary and Sisters of Loretto.management's agenda.  An example would be a shareholder resolution criticizing the company's 
environmental  practices  and  requiring  management  to  change  them.    The  resolution  itself 
expresses the CST notion of responsibility for  stewardship of  creation; its placement on the 
corporate agenda reflects the CST vision of corporate responsibility for the common good.  In the 
communitarian  vision,  therefore,  the  SEC  proxy  rules  are  an  appropriate  use  of  government 
intervention to promote corporate engagement with the common good.
19
This robust vision of the corporation's responsibilities carries with it consequences for how 
the corporation should be governed.  It is not much of a conceptual leap from the assumption that 
a corporation should be governed in a way that enhances its sense of responsibility to the external 
community to the assumption that it should be governed as if it were itself a community.  What 
links both assumptions is an even more fundamental one: corporations should be managed not just 
to maximize shareholder wealth, but to meet their external and internal communal responsibilities. 
 In  other  words,  the  communitarian  vision  breaks  sharply  with  the  shareholder  wealth 
maximization norm that prevails in current economic theory and legal doctrine.
20  In this vision, 
19 Related to this use of the shareholder proposal mechanism are so-called “ethical” or “socially responsible” 
investment  policies  followed  by  some  Catholic  institutions  and  religious  orders.    These  policies  may  require 
disinvestment in issuers who raise social justice concerns because of their investment in weapons manufacture, 
environmental degradation, unjust global wage practices, racism or political oppression.  These policies reflect the 
traditional Catholic “principle of cooperation” which requires avoidance of cooperation in evil, as articulated in U.S. 
CATHOLIC  BISHOPS,  STATEMENT  ON  SOCIALLY  RESPONSIBLE  INVESTING  (Nov.  1991),  available  at http://www. 
osjspm.org/sri-uscc.htm.    The  Bishop's  Statement,  however,  does  not  specify  exactly  the  scope  or  limits  of 
non-cooperative investment practices, leaving it to individual Catholics and Catholic institutions to determine with 
which evils they should avoid cooperating.  Unsurprisingly, there is a growing gap between practices that emphasize 
social justice concerns, and those that regard such emphases as incoherent, arbitrary, biased toward leftist concerns, 
overly broad in their condemnation of businesses such as arms manufacture, and insufficiently attentive to what are 
regarded as more fundamental Catholic moral concerns.  See Samuel Gregg, Investing in Morality, 4 VILL. J. L. & 
INVEST. MGMT. 57, 61-63 (2002) (“Ethical investment funds rarely cater to those who believe that marriage is a basic 
good, that adultery is always wrong, or that intentional abortion, or formal cooperation in intentional abortion, is a 
mortal  sin.”)  at  www.law.villanova.edu.shared/joflawandinvmgmt/docs/fall2002volume4number1.pdf;  Samuel 
Gregg,  Sister  Nicole  and  Ethical  Investing  (Acton  Commentary)  (Oct.  22,  2003),  http://www.acton.org/policy 
/comment/article.php?id=161 (“The Standard lists of ethical priorities also suggests that many ‘socially responsible’ 
criteria have more to do with fashionable causes than with the objective moral life.”).  Such critiques of Catholic 
“socially responsible” investing have led to the creation of “morally responsible” funds that invest only in companies 
who  comport  with  certain  aspects  of  Catholic  moral  teaching.    An  example  is  the  Ave  Maria  Mutual  Funds, 
http://www.avemariafund.com.  The Funds' investment policy is as follows:
Our  Funds  take  a  pro-family  approach  to  investing,  with  a  proprietary  screening  process  that 
examines  corporate  compliance  with  Catholic  teaching  regarding  abortion,  pornography,  and 
policies that undermine the sacrament of marriage.  Investments are made only in companies whose 
operations do not violate the core teachings of the Roman Catholic Church as determined by the 
Funds' Catholic Advisory Board.
http://www.avemariafund.com/avemx.htm.
20  For  the  norm's  application  in  corporate  law,  see  FRANK H.  EASTERBROOK  AND DANIEL  R.  FISCHEL,  THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35-39 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various 
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 
23 (Fall 1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).  Disagreement over the norm, however, is at least as old as 
the Berle-Dodd debate from the 1930s.  See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's 
Turn,  26  J.  CORP.  L.  737,  761-62  (2001)  (“Each  generation  raises  anew  the  same  questions  about  corporate 
accountability because corporations continue to bear importantly on our social and political lives, and external the corporation is governed for the benefit of a range of all the human persons involved in the 
corporate enterprise, which is conceptualized as a community in which stakeholders such as 
employees have more than a contractual claim.  In this vision, furthermore, stakeholders' selfish 
interests do not simply replace or add themselves to shareholders' selfish interests.  There is a shift 
in  emphasis  away  from  wealth  maximization  as  an  end  in  itself,  and  towards  creating  the 
conditions of human flourishing in a broader, relational sense.  Managers must do more than 
mediate among interest groups; they must strive to identify and act upon what is the common 
good.
21
The norm contested by this version of CST is well established.  In its simplest form, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm holds that corporate managers should strive to increase 
shareholder wealth, not that of other corporate stakeholders.  Corporate law theory divides over the 
best  means  of  maximizing  shareholder  wealth,  particularly  in  light  of  the  agency  problem: 
managers' tendency to maximize their own wealth, rather than the shareholders'.  There are sharp 
debates over the relative advantages of mandatory rules versus enabling rules in state corporate 
law, the need for federal regulation of public corporations, the proper limits of private contracting, 
whether  legal  rules  should  facilitate  or  hinder  corporate  takeovers,  and  whether  corporate 
governance should be controlled by managers, directors or shareholders.
22  All these debates, 
however, are over a common question: how does law best maximize shareholder value?  Only at 
regulation can never bring corporate results and perceived social goals into congruence.”).
21  The  CST  communitarian  vision  thus  distinguishes  itself  from  the  secular  stakeholder  model  of  corporate 
governance as well as the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  See, for example, James Gordley's application of 
Thomistic principles to this problem:
Although  neither  Aristotle  nor  Thomas  contemplated  the  modern  corporation,  we  have  been 
proposing what one might call an Aristotelian or Thomistic model of corporate responsibility.  It has 
an ethical foundation that both the shareholder and the stakeholder models lack: it is founded not on 
what each group wants for itself, but on what is normatively good for that group and for others.  
Unlike the stakeholder model, it explains why the duty of managers to seek a profit is different from 
their other obligations.  Managers who do so will be behaving exactly as they should, provided that 
they and others are practicing virtues never mentioned by the economists.
James Gordley, Virtue and the Ethics of Profit Seeking, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS supra note 11, at 
65, 78. Rejection of the stakeholder norm was also crucial to the work of Monsignor John A. Ryan, who rejected the 
notion of the corporation as merely a collection of selfish interests, in favor of a vision of the “just” or “virtuous” 
corporation.  For a concise discussion of Ryan's theory of corporate governance, see David W. Lutz, Christian Social 
Thought and Corporate Governance, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE: THE LEGACY OF MONSIGNOR JOHN A. RYAN 121
(Robert G. Kennedy, et. al., eds., 2001). On Ryan's analysis as an alternative to the stakeholder theory, see id. at 134. 
 This is obviously a highly aspirational view of corporate managers, and does not grapple seriously with the problem 
of agency costs.
22 For a useful critique of both managerialist and shareholder primacy models in favor of a director primacy model, 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, UCLA SCHOOL OF 
LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 02-06, Feb. 2002, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300860. Bainbridge argues that control of 
the corporation is vested in neither the shareholders nor the managers, but in the board of directors.  The board of 
directors thus is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather a sui generis body (a sort of platonic guardian) serving 
as the nexus of the various contracts making up the corporation.  Note that Bainbridge's director primacy model does 
not challenge the shareholder wealth maximization norm: the directors' primary responsibility is still to maximize 
shareholder value.  It is, instead, a rejection of the notion that shareholder value in the public corporation is best 
maximized through shareholder dominance of corporate governance (“shareholder primacy”).  Bainbridge makes this 
distinction at Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 3 n. 4.the margins is the shareholder wealth maximization norm questioned.
23
The communitarian vision, in contrast, questions that norm directly.  By conceptualizing 
the corporation as a community, it posits managers' responsibility to manage the corporation for 
the benefit of the non-shareholder members of its community, as well as in the interest of the 
shareholders.  This position expresses the CST concept that profits, while essential to the success 
of the corporation, are merely instrumental, and not the ultimate purpose of the corporation, thus 
implicitly  rejecting,  or  at  least  de-emphasizing  the  shareholder  wealth  maximization  norm.
24
Supporting devaluation of that norm is CST's understanding of shareholders' property rights as 
enmeshed in a web of reciprocal duties, and that protection of such rights is appropriate only to the 
extent that such protection contributes to the common good.
25
The CST communitarian vision of the corporation is also at odds with the widely-accepted 
Coasean theory of the corporate firm as a nexus of contracts.
26  The “corporation,” in this view, is 
a convenient legal fiction for the intersection of providers of debt  and  equity  capital, labor, 
managerial services and other inputs into an enterprise that is “collective” only in an instrumental 
23 See, e.g., MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT  OF CAPITAL, DETHRONING  THE CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY
107-26 (2001) (arguing that corporate wealth does not legitimately belong only to stockholders, but to those who 
create the wealth — employees); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, AMERICA'S NEWEST 
EXPORT  84-94  (2001)  (arguing  that  the  goal  of  shareholder  wealth  maximization  is  not  only  destroying  the 
corporation, but also the social fabric).
24 In CST, profitability is most frequently understood through the distinction between “foundational” goods and 
“excellent” goods.  Foundational goods are ones we need in order to obtain other goods.  Examples would include 
corporate efficiency and profitability.  Excellent goods are those that support the internal development of the person, 
such as friendship, moral cultivation, or knowledge of and love for God.  This distinction is crucial to understanding 
the purpose of the corporation.
Profitability  and  efficiency  are  worthy  goals  because  their  realization  is  foundational  to  the 
development of the business as a whole.  Nevertheless, foundational goods are not the full story.  
They account neither for the ultimate motivation of our work nor for the first principles of the 
business organizations in which we do our work.  The excellent goods of human development are 
what really motivate us.
HELEN J. ALFORD, O.P. & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERED, CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES IN 
THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 45 (2001).  This limited approbation of the profit motive is typical of mainstream CST. 
See, e.g., Curran's discussion of Pope John Paul II's conditional recognition of “the legitimate role of profit” in 
Centesimus Annus.  CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 12, at 206-09.
25 See, e.g., ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 24, at 47 (“By elevating shareholder wealth to the status of the 
ultimate good, the shareholder model in effect erects a ‘tyranny of foundational goods,’ inhibiting managers from 
considering more excellent goods except as instruments to increase profits.”).
26 The foundational theoretical works on the nexus of contracts theory of the corporate firm are R.H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386 (1937); Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) and Armen A. 
Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972).  For elaboration of the contractarian theory as applied in corporate law, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R.Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law & 
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301 (1993).  For critical analysis, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the 
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the 
Corporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 543 (1990); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business 
Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).  For a reply in defense of the contractarian model, see Fred. S. 
McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 
(1989).sense, with the participants bound to each other only contractually, and bound within a firm, rather 
than across markets, because of the economic efficiency of organizing production in that manner. 
 If corporate stakeholders' rights are conceived in and determined by contract, there would be little 
room for an argument that there are non-contractual claims derived from membership in the 
corporate community that managers must honor.  Indeed, the belief that a corporation is only a 
nexus of contracts, and not a human community bonded by extra-contractual ties, may be regarded 
as the very antithesis of the CST understanding of the corporation as a community.  The largest 
challenge for this understanding, however, is finding a meaningful way to talk about the public 
corporation, with its highly fluid set of stakeholders, most of which have very specific, impersonal 
and often transient relationships to the corporation, as a “community.”
This  version  of  CST  thus  has  much  in  common  with  those  strains  of  “progressive” 
corporate law theory
27 that emphasize the need for legal and regulatory structures that would 
institutionalize a broad sense of corporate social responsibility beyond mere law compliance.  It 
would also cut through current arguments among corporate law theorists about the best way to 
maximize shareholder value - - enhancement of managerial discretion, board empowerment, or 
facilitating shareholder participation in governance - - by proposing a broader conception of the 
purposes  of  corporate  enterprise  and  of  the  common  good  as  the  focus  of  corporate 
decisionmaking.
III. The Argument From Liberty
A. Michael Novak's Theology of the Corporation
What  I  have  called  the  communitarian  vision  of  CST  might  be  called  a  “left 
communitarian” vision, although I have argued that the traditional right/left dichotomy does not fit 
Catholic teaching very  well.  We may, however, call this vision “left,” because some of its 
sympathies and antipathies point in that direction: a comfort with restraints on the exercise of 
property rights and government intervention in economic decisions and a critical attitude toward 
the excesses of capitalism.  Its character is best revealed, however, by contrast to the version of 
CST articulated most strongly by Michael Novak in his very different reading of the meaning of 
“communitarian” for economic life in general and the corporation in particular.
28  His grounding 
of CST in a theological, political and economic concept of the liberty of the individual produces 
27 At the core of the “progressive” corporate law movement are critiques of the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm and the contractarian model.  See generally, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Larry Mitchell ed., 1996); Shann 
Turnbull, THE CASE FOR INTRODUCING STAKEHOLDER CORPORATIONS, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=436400. For a 
critical response, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).  Rejection of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm has also been central to critiques of corporate governance from the standpoint of gender theory 
(Marleen A. O'Connor, AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RESILIENT FAMILIES: INVESTING IN CHILDREN'S 
HUMAN CAPITAL IN TURBULENT TIMES, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=439420); critical race 
theory  (Cheryl  L.  Wade,  Corporate  Governance  as  Corporate  Social  Responsibility:  Empathy  and  Race 
Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461 (2002)); and queer theory (Kellye Testy, Adding Value(s) to Corporate Law: 
An Agenda for Reform, 34 GA. L. REV. 1025 (2000)).
28 See NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 195-208 (emphasizing the 
role of the “communitarian individual” in non-state associations, such as corporations, that mediate between the 
individual and the state).not just a very different philosophical emphasis or tone in discussions of the corporation,
29 but 
very different policy prescriptions.  Novak's body of thought is often in tension with what the 
bishops and other proponents of CST believe that the tradition means,
30 although he believes that 
his vision is deeply consistent with that of Pope John Paul II.
31
While articulated at length in several works, Novak's basic argument is straightforward.  
For Novak, the corporation is an extraordinarily important invention.  Indeed, it is “an invention 
of law that made democratic capitalism possible.”
32  Democratic capitalism, he argues, is what 
lifted humanity out of immemorial poverty, recurrent famine and stasis by replacing traditional 
societies with a differentiation of society into three systems: a political system, an economic 
system  and  a  moral-cultural  system,  each  essentially  independent  of  the  other.
33    This 
differentiation was critical because it created the conditions of individual liberty  essential to 
creativity, change and development.  This idea:
interprets human society as so composed by the Creator that its greatest source of social dynamism is the 
imagination, initiative and liberty of the human individual.  It is an idea whose express purpose is to increase
the material wealth of all nations, at the very least eliminating famine and poverty.
34
Historically, the corporation was crucial to the success of democratic capitalism.
The most original social invention of democratic capitalism, in sum, is the private corporation founded for 
economic purposes.  The motivation for this invention was also social: to increase “the wealth of nations,” to 
generate (for the first time in human history) sustained economic development.  This effect was, in fact, 
achieved.    However,  the  corporationCas  a  type  of  voluntary  associationCis  not  merely  an  economic 
institution.  It is also a moral institution and a political institution.  It depends upon and generates certain 
moral-cultural virtues; it depends upon and generates new political forms.  In two short centuries, it has 
brought about an immense social revolution.  It has moved the center of economic activity from the land to 
industry and commerce. No revolution is without social costs and sufferings, which must be entered on the 
ledger against benefits won.  Universally, however, the idea of economic development has now captured the 
imagination of the human race.  This new possibility of development has awakened the world from its 
29 Among Novak's many writings addressing the economic and legal issues relevant to this discussion are: MICHAEL 
NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (2002); TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION (1990); ON 
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE,  THE  CORPORATION  AS  IT  OUGHT  TO  BE  (1997)  [hereinafter  ON  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE];  CATHOLIC  SOCIAL  THOUGHT  &  LIBERAL  INSTITUTIONS,  supra  note  5.  Novak's  work  has  been 
controversial in Catholic circles. For a description of some of the reactions generated by The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism, see ROGER VAN ALLEN, BEING CATHOLIC: COMMONWEAL FROM THE SEVENTIES TO THE NINETIES 89-94 
(1993).
30 Regarding Novak's disagreements with the American bishops and the Catholic left, see NOVAK, CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at xvi-xvii.  For his analysis of the “six sources of 
distortion” he regards as influencing the thinking of Church leaders and theologians (both Catholic and Protestant) 
about corporations, see NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29 at 11-18.
31 See, e.g. Part III, Chapter 13, in NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 
219-52  (describing  John  Paul  II  as  the  “Pope  of  Liberty,  Pope  of  Creativity”).    Novak's  view  of  the  Pope's 
understanding of capitalism and the corporation is controversial.  See infra, notes 91-95 and accompanying text.  
Novak, however, is not alone in his views.  For citations to the work of other American Catholic neo-conservatives 
who share his perspective on economic issues, see note 91, infra.
32 NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 7.
33 Id. at 9-10.
34 Id. at 37.economic slumber.
35
This passage sounds one of Novak’s principal themes: the corporation is not just a thing to be used 
instrumentally, for good or ill.  It is a “moral institution.”  While Novak’s language is sometimes 
unclear,  he  verges  on  arguing  that  the  corporation  is  intrinsically  good,  particularly  when 
contrasted to the state, for which Novak reserves his deepest suspicions.
Having been the social instrument by which the bourgeoisie, in “scarce one hundred years, has created more 
massive and more colossal productive forces than all preceding generations together," the publicly held 
business corporation is arguably the most successful, transformative, and future-oriented institution in the 
modern world.  It has been far more open, more creative, and infinitely less destructive than the nation-state, 
particularly the totalitarian state.
36
The significance of the corporation for Novak, however, lies beyond its contribution to the 
rise  of  political  capitalism.    The  corporation's  real  significance  is  theological:  “the  modern 
business corporation [is] a much despised incarnation of God's presence in the World.”
37  In his 
principal statement of this position, Toward a Theology of the Corporation, he finds seven “signs 
of grace” in the corporation:
$ Creativity. “The agency through which inventions and discoveries are made is the 
corporation.  Its creativity makes available to mass markets the riches long hidden 
in Creation.  Its creativity mirrors God's.  That is the standard by which its deeds 
and misdeeds are properly judged.”
38
$ Liberty. “The corporation mirrors God's presence also in its liberty, by which 
[Novak] mean[s] independence from the state.”
39
$ Social  Motive.  “The  fundamental  intention  of  the  [corporate]  system  from  the 
beginning has been the wealth of all humanity.”
40
$ Social  Character. “For many millions of religious persons, the daily milieu in 
which  they  work  out  their  salvation  is  the  communal,  corporate  world  of  the 
workplace.”
41
35 Id. at 56.
36 NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 29, at 3.
37 NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 39.  It is not entirely clear what Novak 
means by the phrase “incarnation of God’s presence.”  Is it meant literally to define the corporation as being as aspect 
of  the  Incarnation?    That  would  require  some  explanation.    Or,  is  it  meant  to  describe  the  corporation  as  a 
manifestation of God’s grace, and hence as a sign of God’s presence in the world?  If so, why is it any more such a sign 
than any other human creation?  The corporation, like the state, has been a powerful instrument for producing the 
foundational goods essential for human flourishing.  Whether one or the other is more of a sign of God’s grace is open 
to question, although it is not clear that the question is an important one, given the tragic extent to which each has been 
treated as an end in itself in many different historical circumstances.
38 Id. at 44.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 46.
41 Id. at 47.$ Insight. “The primary capital of any corporation is insight, invention, finding a 
better way.”
42
$ Liberty  and  Election.  “The  corporation  operates  in  a  world  of  no  scientific 
certainty, in which corporate leaders must constantly make judgments about reality 
when not all the evidence about reality is in.”
43
In these seven ways, Novak concludes, “corporations offer metaphors of grace, a kind of 
insight into God's ways in history,” and are places of great moral and theological, as well as 
historical and economic significance.
Novak's theology is more than a little wobbly.  How does corporate creativity “mirror” 
God’s grace?  What precisely is “incarnational” about the corporation as distinct from any other 
human creation?  At times, such is his enthusiasm that his “theology of the corporation” verges on 
an idolatry of the corporation that does not even admit the possibility of critique.  Novak does, 
however,  propose  an  internally  coherent  view  of  how  the  corporation  should  be  viewed  by 
Christians:
$ The corporation is a crucial locus for the playing out of God-given human liberty.
$ The corporation is an extraordinarily successful instrument for creatively realizing 
the riches of God's world for the benefit of humanity, and to “serve human needs, 
desires,  and  rational  interests  is  also  to  serve  human  liberty,  conscience,  and 
God.”
44
$ The corporation is a communal association that mediates between individuals and 
the state, allowing collective action while protecting liberty from the overwhelming 
force of the state.
$ The corporation's independence from the state is crucial to its ability to perform 
those functions.
It should be obvious that Novak's framing of this vision is a response to socialist and Marxist 
theorists  who,  he  claims,  would  collapse  the  boundaries  between  economic,  political  and 
moral-cultural systems essential to Novak's conception of democratic capitalism.  His theology of 
the corporation is thus both an affirmation of the Christian nature of the capitalist world view (or 
the capitalist nature of the Christian world view) and a pointed critique of a socialist (or, generally, 
“statist”) world view regarded by some as more essentially Christian.
Novak  is  particularly  concerned  with  countering  Catholic  or  Protestant  thinkers 
(particularly clergy) who approach economic life, or criticize corporations, from standpoints that 
seem to him particularly misguided.  They are often misguided, he frequently points out, because 
42 NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 47.
43 Id. at 48-49.
44 Id. at 31.their education, experience and social prejudices prevent them from really knowing anything 
about economics or the business world.  Even worse, according to Novak, they are either frankly 
socialist,  tainted  by  an  anti-capitalist  bias  common  to  intellectuals,  afflicted  by  a  “lingering 
nostalgia”  for  a  Constantinian  planned  society,  in  thrall  to  antique,  pre-capitalist  notions  of 
economics, or subject to guilt or sentimental notions about poverty and wealth inequality.  These 
misconceptions,  he  argues,  have  led  too  many  Catholic  and  Protestant  religious  leaders  and 
intellectuals to indulge in criticism of capitalism and corporations that ignores not only their 
contributions to human welfare but also their identity as manifestations of God's grace.
45 His 
repeated condemnation of this strand of religious thought on economic life is sweeping, and 
ignores more nuanced religious critiques of capitalism and its effects, most notably that of CST 
itself.   Nevertheless, he presses his attack even further.
Religious thinkers’ critical attitude toward corporations, he argues, demonstrates a failure 
to appreciate the true meaning of community and subsidiarity.  For Novak, “community” depends 
on the vitality of the many economic, civic, religious and private associations that constrain the 
power of the state and mediate between it and individuals vulnerable to its power.  This anti-statist 
version  of  communitarianism  (a  kind  of  “right  communitarianism”)  emphasizes  how 
intermediating  associations  preserve  the  tripartite  division  of  the  economic,  political  and 
moral-cultural essential to democratic capitalism and limited government.
46  The integrity of those 
associations and their independence from the state is preserved by adherence to the principle of 
subsidiarity as an ordering principle.  The business corporation, in Novak's estimation, is perhaps 
the most important of those associations.
Novak is concerned, however, with more than countering philosophically what he regards 
as the carping about soul-less capitalism emanating from religious quarters.  His insistence on the 
importance  of  preserving  the  independence  of  corporations  leads  him  to  a  profoundly 
anti-regulatory stance, opposition to conceptions of “social justice” involving legally-mandated 
wealth redistribution or concern for non-shareholder constituencies, and interference with the 
freedom of corporations to perform their economic functions.  This basic stance—valorization of 
the corporation, rejection of regulatory or legal restraints on corporate liberty, and disdain for the 
state-imposed conceptions of corporate social responsibility—determines his views on how the 
law should (or should not) influence the management of corporations.
When focusing directly on current controversies over corporate governance, Novak has 
articulated a strongly managerialist position.  He begins by drawing a sharp distinction between 
government, with all of the checks and balances needed to restrain its power, and governance of a 
45 One of Novak's favorite complaints is about religious thinkers' lack of educational or experiential qualifications 
for opining about economics or business, as well as their pre-modern, socialist or statist biases about those topics.  See, 
e.g., NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 15, 56; NOVAK, TOWARD A 
THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION supra note 29, at 5-6, 11-18, 59.  Novak apparently regards his own view of 
economic life, and the significance of religion  for ordering economic relations, as objective and unbiased, and 
reflecting  a  clear-eyed,  unsentimental  understanding  of  how  the  world  really  operates.    Whether  Novak’s 
understanding of economics is any better than that of the wooly-minded, impractical leftist clergy he disparages so 
obsessively is unclear.  He is as romantic about corporations and capitalism as some of them may be about the virtues 
of poverty or pre-modern or socialist economies.
46 See generally NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 28.corporation, which should be designed to support the corporation's nimbleness and creativity.
Wise persons do not want governments to act until they are carried forward, like rhinoceroses rising slowly 
from the mud by the hydraulic force of a very large and durable consensus.  But the same wise persons want 
business corporations to be able to act quickly, even to turn on a dime when they are losing money or when 
they spot suddenly arising possibilities, to take the risks for which their investors have entrusted them with 
well-defined executive power.
47
For Novak, corporate managers should be left free to do what they do best (maximize 
profits),  and  certainly  should  not  be  criticized  by  the  envious  for  their  allegedly  “obscene” 
compensation, or be “played for patsies” by those who “want to socialize the corporations.”
48
“Appeasement”  of  “movements  such  as  environmentalism,  the  philosophy  of  stakeholders, 
children's rights, and some forms of feminism and gay rights”
49 would be succumbing to “former 
socialists [who] want to tame the business corporation, make it sit up and dance, perhaps do tricks 
to music.”
50  Novak urges no concessions:
to causes dear to statists, such as executive pay caps, incentives and mandates to cover training and layoffs, 
constraints on internationalization, demands for a Germanic system of “public interest” corporate directors, 
and other moves towards the socialization of corporate America.
51
It is by no means easy to discern exactly who Novak is complaining about in this passage.  Who 
exactly are his “statists,” and what exactly is a statist?  Are all statists “former socialists?”  Would 
he include in the “statist” category anyone who conceives of a broader role than he does for 
mandatory, rather than enabling rules in corporate governance?  Would the category include those 
who accept the shareholder wealth maximization norm, but would urge a different balance of 
regulatory intervention and deferral to private contracting?  In Novak’s Manichean universe, the 
common  good  is  served  only  by  the  release  of  legal  restraints  on  economic  (particularly 
entrepreneurial) energies.  Accordingly, any state-imposed rules of corporate governance that 
would constrain corporate behavior for any “social” purpose would divert corporations from the 
only  goal  through  which  they  can  actually  serve  the  common  good:  the  maximization  of 
shareholder wealth.  In any event, Novak repudiates, emphatically and unambiguously, both the 
general approach and specific positions associated with the left communitarian version of CST 
thinking  about  the  corporation.    Legal  rules  mandating  limits  on  executive  compensation,
52
managerial  consideration  of  the  interests  of  non-shareholder  constituencies,
53  and  broader 
corporate social responsibility are anathema.
54
Novak's analysis of corporate governance nods to Coase and other aspects of economic 
47 NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 29, at 7.
48 Id. at 9, 20.
49 Id. Cf. supra note 27, regarding the relevance of such considerations to corporate governance.
50 Id. at 9.
51 Id. at 23.
52 Id. at 24-27 (regarding critiques of executive compensation as “unjust” or “unfair” as reeking of “envy”).
53 Id. at 3-9 (distinguishing between managerialist governance of a corporation and participatory government of a 
state).
54 NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 60-61 (arguing that “those critics of the 
corporation at the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility” need a better theology of the corporation).theory,
55  but  it  derives  principally  from  his  philosophical  emphasis  on  the  centrality  of  the 
independence of the business corporation to democratic capitalism, which he regards as essential 
to human liberty, flourishing and dignity.   In that manner, he  attempts to link a profoundly 
anti-statist defense of liberal economics and opposition to legal rules constraining managerial 
discretion, to CST theological concepts of the common good, human dignity and incarnational 
humanism.
Novak’s encomium to capitalism and the role of the corporation within it presumes a deep 
affinity between capitalism and Christianity.  For Novak, the communitarian interpretation of the 
social tradition is not an organic, authentic expression of the tradition, but a distortion spawned by 
leftist bias.  Ultimately, he sees himself as vindicating the “real” truth of the tradition.  It will be 
argued below that he has it exactly backwards.
B. Beyond Novak: Bainbridge's Integration of Law, Economics and CST
Stephen Bainbridge has published a series of pioneering articles that seek to define the 
theoretical relationship between the jurisprudential school of law and economics and CST, and 
attempts to apply the two approaches to problems of corporate law in an integrated way that 
identifies both affinities and tensions between them.  While Bainbridge speaks admiringly of 
Novak, employs his rhetoric, and believes his arguments derive from Novak’s, he is actually far 
less dependent on grandiose and questionable theological propositions, and far more sophisticated 
than Novak in his critical application of economics to CST precepts on the corporation and 
corporate law.  He thus presents a more serious challenge to the communitarian vision than Novak.
Bainbridge's understanding of law and economics rests on the principle that economic 
analysis can be normative, and that the key norm is wealth maximization, so that “law should seek 
to increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of everything in society.”
56  The 
threshold question, then, is whether “wealth maximization is an appropriate moral norm on which 
a Christian legal scholar may draw.”
57  Bainbridge concludes that it indeed is.  In an apologia for 
the use of law and economics analysis by a Christian scholar, Bainbridge begins with the classic 
defense  of  wealth  maximization  as  a  “rising  tide  [that]  lifts  all  boats,”
58  and  that  “wealth 
maximization may be the most direct route to a variety of moral ends.”
59  He follows Novak in 
asserting that Christian criticism of the norm is often a function of socialist or statist bias in favor 
of “aid and comfort to the Leviathan state.”
60  He agrees, ultimately, with the proposition that “The 
55 NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 29, at 12 (discussing Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” supra
note 26).  Novak’s occasional nods to economic theory tend to be superficial make-weights.  In using such arguments 
to  lambaste  government  intervention,  he  offers  nothing  about  the  effect  of  transactional  costs  on  the  efficient 
allocation of resources or the problem of market failure.
56 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, ROBERT F. COCHRAN, 
JR., AND ANGELA C. CARMELLA, EDS., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 208, 209 (2001) [hereinafter 
Law & Economics]. For a more critical discussion of law and economics from a Catholic perspective, see George E. 
Garvey, A Catholic Social Teaching Critique of Law and Economics, in id. at 224.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 210.
59 Id. at 211.
60 See Bainbridge, Law & Economics, supra note 56, at 211.divine plan was indeed that we should enjoy the fruits of the earth and of our own industry, and 
[wealth maximization] is the best way we have yet devised to organize the latter.”
61
Bainbridge recognizes, however, that a “Christian legal scholar should approach law and 
economics . . . [by] viewing the normative claims of economic analysis as merely a subset of the 
full panoply of ethical and moral principles by which we are called to live as Christians.”
62  He 
would thus seem to acknowledge the traditional CST distinction between “foundational” and 
“excellent” goods, and thus does not seem to make the kind of categorical mistake on which 
Novak constantly verges in his virtually unqualified approbation of the pursuit of wealth.  While 
Bainbridge thus recognizes in theory that Christian normative values should trump the wealth 
maximization norm, he is suspicious of what the implementation of that theory would mean.  In 
particular, to the extent that Christian values would impose a preference for state-imposed legal 
structures promoting wealth redistribution rather than wealth maximization, Bainbridge jumps 
ship.  Bainbridge does so principally in reliance on public choice theory's premise that most 
legislative attempts to redistribute wealth are driven by highly effective special interest groups at 
the expense of larger, more diffuse and less effective groups.
63  Interpretation of Christian values 
as weighted toward state-mandated wealth redistribution would thus seem to him to produce 
perverse  results.    Bainbridge's  public  choice  perspective  thus  leaves  him  with  significant 
reservations about CST's critical posture toward the wealth inequalities generated by capitalism, 
as well as its assumption that law should be used to constrain capitalism's production of wealth 
inequality.
Bainbridge's ambivalence (or hostility) to the practical consequences of applying CST 
norms (particularly through government mandates) is expressed in his consideration of specific 
CST positions on issues of corporate governance.  In an article
64 criticizing the American bishops' 
1986  pastoral  letter  Economic  Justice  for  All,
65  Bainbridge  identifies  and  challenges 
well-established CST positions favoring labor participation in corporate decisionmaking.  While 
he denies that his goal is to determine whether those positions are accurate statements of CST or 
Catholic doctrine generally,
66 he joins Novak in condemning the extrapolation of this particular 
policy recommendation from CST principles.  His main goal, however, is to determine whether the 
CST position should be enacted into positive law, and he answers that question through arguments 
from  economics  and  political  theory,  rather  than  theology.    Bainbridge  concludes  that  the 
arguments supporting mandatory labor participation in corporate governance are overbroad, and 
61 Id. at 212, quoting Paul Johnson’s defense of capitalism in Paul Johnson, Blessing Capitalism, COMMENTARY, 
May 1993, at 33, 34.
62 Id. at 213.
63 Id. at 216-23 (explaining rational choice theory).
64 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking, supra note 14.
65 NATIONAL CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL].  For a collection of 
varying  responses  to  Economic  Justice,  see THE  CATHOLIC  CHALLENGE  TO  THE  AMERICAN  ECONOMY: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE U.S. BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
(Thomas M. Gannon, ed., 1988). See also DOUGLAS RASMUSSEN AND JAMES P. STERBA, THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS 
AND THE ECONOMY: A DEBATE (1987) (authors agree that the bishops did not provide an adequate philosophical 
defense for their policy recommendations, but disagree about whether a defense is possible). On the debates over the 
pastoral letter among Catholic commentators, see VAN ALLEN, supra note 29, at 94-97.
66 See Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 828.give the concept a centrality it does not deserve.
He  rests  his  conclusion  partially  on  evidence  that  most  workers  do  not  want  such 
participation and do not particularly benefit from it where it is in effect.
67  More theoretically, 
Bainbridge objects to the way such mandatory rules reflect social goals inconsistent with the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm that he regards as central to corporate law.
68  He also draws 
on familiar law and economics arguments to predict that mandatory labor representation on boards 
would increase agency costs,
69 and that firms have sufficient incentives to enter into implicit 
contracts protecting employees from possible exploitation by managers.
70  His primary theoretical 
objection to mandatory participation rules, however, is to the statist character of such intervention. 
 In critiquing a Bishop's pastoral letter urging participatory governance, Bainbridge argued that:
Despite its democratic rhetoric, Catholic social teaching, as preached by the Bishop's pastoral letter, has a 
strong statist slant.  Although they do not support nationalizing industry, the Bishop's support of regulation 
designed to protect employees and encourage their participation in corporate governance differs only in 
degree, and not in kind, from collectivism.
71
Bainbridge thus repudiates the tradition within CST that turns to the state as the source of legal 
rules intended to foster human dignity.  Interestingly, Bainbridge does not rely on Novakian 
theology  to  make  this  point.    He  is  expressing  an  essentially  libertarian  take  on  the  proper 
relationship of the state and economic actors.
Having  rejected  the  CST  argument  favoring  mandatory  participatory  governance, 
Bainbridge  turned  in  a  later  article
72  to  a  related  problem:  the  American  bishops'  foray  in 
Economic Justice for All
73 into the corporate stakeholder debate.  This debate turns on the question 
of whether directors should (or must) consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.
74
Bainbridge summarized the bishops' position in this debate as follows:
The Bishops assert that a board of directors' decisions affect a much broader class of constituency groups than 
merely  their  shareholders.    Employees,  managers,  customers,  creditors,  suppliers,  and  communities  all 
contribute to the enterprise, all have a stake in its success, and all are affected by its actions.  Hence, their 
interests must be reflected in the corporate decisionmaking process.  To be sure, the Bishops acknowledged 
67 Id. at 817.
68 Id. at 827-28.
69 Id. at 822.
70 Id. at 70.
71 See Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 809.
72 See Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2.
73 See ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 65, at 55-59, 148, 150-51.
74 For contributions to this debate see Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic 
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A 
Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L J. 401 (1993); Stephen; Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders 
v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 
(1998); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984); Mark E. Van Der 
Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996).the directors' and officers' legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.  They argued, however, that 
“morally  this  legal  responsibility  may  be  exercised  only  within  the  bounds  of  justice  to  employees, 
customers, suppliers, and the local community.”  In other words, corporate decisionmakers have a moral 
obligation to balance a decision's impact on stakeholders against its economic impact on shareholders.
75
While acknowledging that the Bishops' letter “was not too far out of step with the mainstream,”
76
of CST, Bainbridge raises the question of whether this statement best reflects the Catholic social 
tradition,  suggesting,  as  have  others,  that  the  post-1986  encyclicals  Laborem  Exercens  and 
Centesimus Annus, “temper much of what was said in Economic Justice for All.”
77 He does not 
dwell, however, on the question of whether the Bishop’s letter represents a departure from the 
Catholic social tradition.  Bainbridge seems mainly concerned with testing whether the bishops' 
position holds up when its costs and benefits are measured with the analytical tools of law and 
economics.  This inquiry, he argues, is an exercise in determining practical reasonableness and 
thus entirely consistent with the anti-consequentialist premises of natural law and Christian moral 
philosophy.
78  He also argues that his dissent from the bishops' positions is an entirely legitimate 
exercise of prudential judgment in determining the meaning of Catholic doctrine for economic 
life,
79a conclusion which is surely correct.  Not surprisingly, Bainbridge concludes emphatically 
that the bishops' position constitutes bad public policy and bad corporate law.
The core of his critique is a challenge to the bishops' normative assumptions supporting 
their belief that non-shareholder interests should be taken as seriously by directors as shareholder 
interests.    The  bishops  assume  that  the  corporations  should:  (i)  function  democratically  by 
allowing all corporate constituents to participate in firm decisions; and (ii) constitute an economic 
“community” of shared interests and reciprocal moral duties that fosters each member’s human 
dignity.  Bainbridge repudiates both normative assumptions. The democratic model, he argues, is 
particularly inappropriate for the large public company, which is almost invariably organized 
hierarchically for sound economic reasons.  Even worse, the communitarian model, “strain[s] 
credulity past the breaking point.”
80  It simply does not work, he argues, in the context of a large 
75 See, Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 10.
76 Id. at 11.
77 Id.  For disagreement with this assertion, see infra¸ notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
78 See generally id. at 6-8, where Bainbridge argues that efficiency-based arguments are not inconsistent with the 
anti-consequentialist premises of natural law theory, because we discern the “eternal enactments of divine authority” 
through what John Finnis calls the test of “practical reasonableness,” citing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 10-27 (1980).  Finnis, he argues, “concedes that one should seek to achieve the good by actions 
that are efficient for their purposes.”  Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 8.  He then concludes that if “even a prominent 
non-consequentialist is willing to admit that cost-benefit analysis comes into play when analyzing natural law 
claims, it seems we may do so with some confidence.”  Id.  He concedes, however, that “Finnis constrains the 
efficiency criterion by reference to other moral criteria.” Id. at 8, note 20.  It may be that Bainbridge is allowing the 
consequentialist  tail  to  wag  the  anti-consequentialist  dog  in  using  Finnis'  limited  recognition  of  the  value  of 
efficiency analysis in determining the practical reasonableness of a legal or economic proposition to justify the 
preeminence that Bainbridge wishes to give that mode of analysis.  While such analysis is indeed relevant in the 
process of moral discernment, it by no means trumps other moral concerns, and can only play an inherently limited 
part in determining morally correct policies.
79 See Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 4, where Bainbridge correctly cites the Catechism to the effect that lay 
initiative is encouraged in discerning the means for permeating social, economic and political realities with Christian 
doctrine.  CATECHISM, supra note 8, ¶892.
80 Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 15.public corporation, quoting Roberta Romano, who has observed that “[communal] characteristics 
cannot survive within large hierarchal corporations, whose dynamics undermine and destabilize 
the egalitarian basis of social relationships.”
81  The communitarian model is also theoretically 
unsound, he concludes, because it is flatly inconsistent with law and economics' understanding of 
the corporation as a nexus of contracts.
82
Perhaps  even  more  important  to  Bainbridge  is  his  belief  that  the  equation  of 
non-shareholders interests with shareholder interests would undermine the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.  Because that norm is central to the legal regime within which the corporation 
has  made  “its  valuable  social  contributions,”
83  the  communitarian  model  would  produce 
conceptual confusion.  Moreover, a legal system that attempted to force consideration of the 
interests of non-shareholders into corporate decisions also would produce more than a theoretical 
problem; it would produce the practical problems of increased agency costs to the benefit of 
neither shareholder nor other stakeholders.
84
Bainbridge's critique of the bishops' position in the stakeholder debate using the analytical 
tools of law and economics is thus unremittingly negative, and that critique is the core of his 
argument.  He also insists, however, that government-mandated consideration of non-shareholder 
constituencies would be an affront both as a matter of political philosophy (citing principally Paul 
Johnson and Russell Kirk)
85 and what he regards as the essential principles of CST.  Drawing on 
Novak, he regards such government intervention in private decisionmaking as inconsistent with 
both the concern for human freedom expressed in Centesimus Annus (as Novak understands it) and 
the principle of subsidiarity that protects associations from interference from above.
86  While 
Bainbridge's attempt to  harmonize the premises and methodology of law and  economics  (as 
applied to corporate law) with those of CST (and Catholic thought generally) is the least developed 
part of his critique, he does make the Novakian point that a shared concern with human freedom 
and  economic  liberty  creates  a  deeper  affinity  between  economics  and  CST  than  does  the 
“collectivist” left communitarian vision.
87
The contrast between the Novak/Bainbridge argument from economic liberty and the more 
mainstream communitarian vision of CST is stark.  But what does that conflict mean for our 
understanding of CST and, specifically, its significance for corporate law?
81 Id. at 15 (quoting Romano, supra note 74, at 948).
82 Id. at 14. (“The economists' contractual understanding is not communitarian in nature.”)
83 Id. at 27.
84 Id.
85 Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 26.
86 Id.  Whether Novak is correct in his description of the concept of human freedom expressed in Centesimus 
Annus is disputable.  For Pope John Paul II, human liberty is best understood in the ancient Catholic (and particularly 
Augustinian) tradition as the freedom to do the good.  When liberty is understood in that sense, it plays a different 
role in the Catholic value system than it does in Novak’s.  Furthermore, while John Paul II in Centesimus Annus is 
acutely aware of the inhibiting effects of excessive government intervention in economic life, his position on the 
proper role of government is far  more  nuanced (and permissive) than Novak’s, and  reflects a  less one-sided 
application of the principle of subsidiarity.
87 Bainbridge elaborates this point forcefully in his contribution to this symposium, Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation, 1 J. CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT (forthcoming May 2004).IV. The Meanings of the Conflict
In trying to determine what the conflict between those two competing visions means, I am 
not going to offer judgments about Bainbridge's positions in the secular debates over the wealth 
maximization norm, the theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts, labor participation in corporate 
governance,  or  corporate  directors'  responsibilities  for  non-shareholder  constituencies,  even 
though  his  positions  in  these  debates  lead  him  to  reject  mainstream  CST  positions  on  the 
corporation and economic life.  Suffice it to say for purposes of this discussion that his positions 
on those issues are controversial in purely secular terms.  I will argue, however, that the conflict 
between the communitarian vision and Novak’s and Bainbridge’s related, but different critiques 
indicates that much fundamental theoretical and practical analysis remains to be done before CST 
can be a useful normative framework for understanding corporate law.  I reach this conclusion in 
view of two problems that emerge from the conflict.
First,  Novak’s  approach  represents,  at  best,  an  outlier  position  in  the  Catholic  social 
tradition.  It creates fundamental theoretical tensions, and it proposes policies that do not serve the 
goals  of  the  tradition.    His  core  principles—the  centrality  of  economic  liberty,  the  social 
beneficence of the pursuit of profit, and implacable hostility to government intervention into 
economic life (“statism”)—are deeply rooted in the classical liberal tradition.  They also resonate 
in CST to the extent that the tradition, and particularly Pope John Paul II, recognize the importance 
of economic liberty to human liberty and dignity, the legitimacy of the profit motive in the exercise 
of human creativity in the production of socially beneficial wealth, the crucial function of private 
associations as mediating institutions, and the moral dangers of the welfare state.  But these 
principles are understood conditionally in the CST tradition in a way foreign to Novak and other 
Catholic neoconservatives.
For example, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis Pope John Paul II recognizes the value of “the 
right of economic initiative,” particularly in its importance to the creation of greater wealth, but 
insists that such “wealth must be distributed in accord with the demands of human solidarity and 
distributive  justice.”
88    This  emphasis  on  distributional  justice  is  central  to  Catholic  social 
teaching, but is usually viewed with suspicion by Novak, because he usually sees distributionist 
goals as naive, expressions of leftist bias, or tied to statist intervention.
89  Pope John Paul II also 
expresses his ambivalence about economic liberty and profit-seeking in Centesimus Annus.  As 
Charles Curran explains: 
On one hand, John Paul II affirms the importance of “initiative and entrepreneurial ability” and recognizes 
“the legitimate role of profit.”  On the other hand, the state “has the task of determining the juridical 
framework  within  which  economic  affairs  are  to  be  conducted;”  the  free  market  alone  cannot  satisfy 
fundamental human needs.  Although profit plays a legitimate role, other human and moral factors also have 
roles to play.
90
88 CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 12, at 195.
89 See, e.g., NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 29, at 12-17, 29; 30; NOVAK, 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 12-15.
90 CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 12, at 207.  Novak certainly agrees with John Paul II's 
criticism of “economism” as a perspective that makes the “science” of economics into an ideology through which 
human life is judged by economic criteria alone.  NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS,Novak and others
91 are thus overstating their case when they assert that “In Centesimus annus
Rome has assimilated American ideas of economic liberty.”
92  As David Hollenbach has pointed 
out, “It would be a serious mistake to think that the Pope has blessed the form of capitalism 
existing in the United States today.  In fact, the encyclical is a major challenge to much recent U.S. 
economic and social policy.”
93  Furthermore, the Pope's criticism of the modern welfare state is not 
a criticism of state intervention per se or the goals of social assistance; it is a critique of the state 
for  relying  on  impersonal  bureaucracies  rather  than  helping  foster  a  more  participatory 
community.
94  Indeed, John Paul II's Laborem Exercens, with its emphasis on the common good, 
the social mortgage on private property, and joint ownership of the means of work, sets out a 
“vision of a just social order that is best described as a modified form of socialism, built on a new 
view  of  human  rights,  political  and  economic  democracy,  and  a  demand  for  moral 
self-consciousness and realization, grounded in political/economic rights.”
95  This description of 
the Pope's vision as “socialism” underestimates his appreciation of private economic initiative, and 
 Novak is correct in asserting that the Pope and the CST tradition strongly support democratic 
capitalism, but it does suggest that Novak is incorrect insofar as he de-emphasizes the Pope's and 
the tradition's robustly communitarian message.
Novak and Bainbridge's critique of Economic Justice for All is an example of the profound 
division in Catholic circles that the  Bishops’ letter  generated.  The  Letter exposed the deep 
disagreement between the Catholic right and left over the meaning of the faith for economic 
policy.  Both sides staked out antithetical positions on the question of whether the Bishops had 
departed from the Catholic social tradition, indulging their leftist, statist biases in their theoretical 
assumptions  and  practical  prescriptions.    To  my  mind,  the  letter  is  firmly  within  CST's 
communitarian tradition as it evolved in the late twentieth century United States.  Even Bainbridge 
acknowledges that the pastoral letter “was not too far out of step with the mainstream of Catholic 
social thought.”
96 Economic Justice for All is but one in a series of statements by the American 
bishops that aligned them with democratic capitalism and against Marxism and socialism, but 
which  were  also  strongly  pro-labor  and  pro-social  welfare  legislation,  and  which  favored 
supra note 5, at 7, 24.  He recognizes that CST “sees a large role” for morality in governing economic practices. Id. 
Novak thus would deny that he is practicing “economism.”  That may be true, but it does not mean that Novak has 
accurately assessed the Pope's economic thought.
91 See Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 11; Richard John Neuhaus, An Argument About Human Nature, in A 
NEW WORLDLY ORDER: JOHN PAUL II AND HUMAN FREEDOM 123, 124 (George Weigel, ed., 1992).  Father Neuhaus 
and Weigel join Novak as leading proponents of an American neo-conservative version (or critique) of CST
92 Michael Novak, Tested by Our Own Ideals, in JOHN PAUL II AND MORAL THEOLOGY: READINGS IN MORAL 
THEOLOGY, 325 (Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, eds., 1998), Curran has acknowledged that Novak 
“rightly points out” that John Paul II attempted to correct the imbalance in CST between emphasis on the distribution 
of wealth and insufficient emphasis on the production of wealth.  Curran, supra note 10, at 194.  Curran goes on to 
show, however, that the Pope's defense of “the right of economic initiative” is tempered by an insistence that the 
wealth  created  by  such  initiative  “must  be  distributed  in  accord  with  the  demands  of  human  solidarity  and 
distributive justice.” Id. at 195.
93 David Hollenbach, The Pope and Capitalism, AMERICA, June 1, 1991, at 591.
94 CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 12, at 209.
95 GEORGE E. MCCARTHY & ROYAL W. RHODES, ECLIPSE OF JUSTICE: ETHICS, ECONOMICS  AND  THE LOST 
TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 178 (1992).
96 Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 2, at 11.co-partnership  between  labor  and  capital  in  the  governance  and  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production, broad sharing in economic development, and amelioration of the gross inequalities in 
the distribution of wealth.
97  Historically, these positions linked the institutional Church in the 
United States with the New Deal
98 and political progressives' willingness to involve the state in 
producing social and economic justice.  The bishops' identification of racism and poverty as 
“sinful social structures”
99 also provided a philosophical basis for the shareholder activism of 
Catholic religious orders who find common ground with political progressives.
The  bishops'  long-standing  concerns,  furthermore,  do  not  express  a  leftist-materialist 
obsession with broader distribution of wealth.  Their concerns embody a Christian anthropology 
that defines wealth as merely instrumental, as merely a means of creating the material conditions 
under which spiritual goods can flourish.  While Novak and Bainbridge presumably would agree 
with that distinction, they would disagree with the corollary assumption that human flourishing is 
bound up with policies supporting participatory corporate governance and prioritization of the 
subjective experience of work, particularly when the state has anything to do with them.  The 
ubiquity of those propositions in both the encyclicals and the bishops' statements shows that they 
are not the expression of secular leftist biases imported into or grafted onto CST, but rather are an 
organic expression of a particular vision of the meaning of work and the nature of the human 
person in community.  Indeed, in all fairness, it is the strong classical liberal and libertarian biases 
that Novak and Bainbridge bring to their reading of CST that is anomalous and inorganic.  The
normative framework they employ for determining questions of corporate policy and law is thus 
more of a challenge to than an expression of the Catholic social tradition.  A corporate law scholar 
seeking to employ CST's normative framework in approaching problems of corporate law and 
policy thus will find their work useful and provocative, but ultimately not satisfactory.
   That  problem,  however,  reveals  a  second  problem.    While  Catholic  business  ethicists  and 
economists have begun to formulate a conception of the corporate community centered on the 
notion of the common good, rather than either the shareholder or stakeholder models of corporate 
governance, and while Catholic activists have used the shareholder proposal mechanism to engage 
corporations with pursuit of the common good, a CST/communitarian version of corporate law is 
yet to emerge.  A broad frame of reference exists, but translation of the abstract theological and 
moral principles of CST into legal theory and specific recommendations for legal reform has not 
really begun.
100  There remains an element of the platitudinous about the CST communitarian 
97  For  analysis  of  the  American  bishops'  twentieth-century  statements  on  the  economy,  see MCCARTHY  & 
RHODES, supra note 95, at 18-29.  McCarthy and Rhodes contest the claim that Economic Justice for All departs 
from the bishops' own tradition of emphasizing individual virtue by endorsing partisan political programs. Id. at 26.
98 The contributions of Monsignor John A. Ryan, one of the architects of the American CST tradition, to the New 
Deal, are well-known.  See FRANCIS L. BRODERICK, RIGHT REVEREND NEW DEALER: JOHN A. RYAN (1963).  See 
also JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 150-57 (2003) (describing the 1930s as a high 
point of the Catholic-liberal alliance on economic issues despite ongoing disagreements over sexuality).
99 See MCCARTHY & RHODES, supra note 95, at 24-25 (describing bishops' statements focusing on structural 
problems of poverty and racism).
100 For a provocative discussion of how CST, despite its thinking about the proper distribution of rewards for 
work, has provided little guidance for thinking about the moral significance of risk-taking by investors in a business 
enterprise, see Edmond Malinvaud, A Gap in the Social Doctrine of the Church Regarding the Priority of Labor 
Over Capital: The Proper Role of Finance, in WORK AS KEY, supra note 9, at 129.  Malinvaud asks, quite properly, 
“how could the Church take position in the debate between stockholder and stakeholder value if she is not better vision that needs to be transformed into something more concrete.  How, as Bainbridge has 
pointed out, can a large public corporation be conceptualized and actualized as a community, 
given the transient nature of the various kinds of interest in the corporation and its hierarchal 
economic structure?  If the stakeholder and shareholder models are both just different ways of 
actualizing selfish interests, and do not focus on the common good that should be the corporate 
goal, how do we define the nature and limits of that good, and how do we operationalize it as a 
goal,  recognizing  the  unavoidable  problems  of  agency  costs?    How  do  we  use  regulatory 
intervention  or  mandatory  legal  rules  to  achieve  a  reorientation  of  corporate  governance  or 
corporations' sense of social responsibility without producing perverse results?  Bainbridge, in 
particular, has made the valuable contribution of showing the difficulties with implementation of 
CST/communitarian goals in corporate law.  There is a great need for theoretical imagination and 
practical ingenuity in finding ways to overcome those difficulties, if CST is going to be anything 
other  than  a  challenging,  but  ultimately  irrelevant  set  of  religious  reflections  on  business 
organization and behavior.
I have argued that Bainbridge's reliance on the shareholder wealth maximization norm and 
the contractual theory of the firm fits awkwardly with CST.  His work represents, however, an 
escape from the platitudinous.  He has shown, in particular, how difficult it is to derive specific
guidance from CST's theological propositions and moral norms for corporate law.  His criticism 
of the Bishops’ letter may be most valuable in the way it shows how the move from general CST 
principles  to  highly  specific  policy  recommendations  and  prescriptions  for  legal  change  is 
inherently  problematic,  because  such  recommendations  and  prescriptions  are  subject  to 
disagreement  on  prudential  grounds  even  among  people  who  share  a  Catholic  perspective.   
Nevertheless, if CST is going to be meaningful, it must provide a means for moving from the 
general to the specific.  Bainbridge has led the way in showing how that might be done in corporate 
law theory.  His critique of the Bishops’ letter and CST doctrine on participatory governance, 
however, may be more of a fundamental criticism of basic CST precepts themselves rather than a 
prudential  disagreement  with  specific  applications  of  those  precepts.    There  are  versions  of 
corporate law theory more congruent with CST’s communitarian vision than Bainbridge’s.  While
wholly secular in inspiration, those versions of corporate law theory that emphasize broader 
participation in corporate governance, stronger mechanisms of corporate accountability, legal 
structures for corporate social responsibility, and, ultimately, rethinking of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, provide a set of analytical tools that would help CST move from moral 
exhortation to a concrete agenda for change.  In return, CST would provide corporate law theory 
a normative framework that would give its reform agenda greater moral and spiritual weight and 
conviction. 
informed about what is meant in reality by this debate?” Id. at 129.